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THE IMPACT OF GRANTS, TAX CREDITS AND EDUCATION SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS ON PARENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLEGE EXPENSES AND
THE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF CHILDREN

ABSTRACT
This paper presents a multi-period, dynamic programming model of household choices
on savings, consumption, having children and helping to fund children's education. Data
from the National Longitudinal Survey young women cohort are used to estimate the
parameters of the model.

The full structural model is estimated using a simulated

maximum likelihood procedure utilizing the dynamic programming model solution to
create simulated data samples from which nonparametric kernel estimators are used to
construct the densities in the likelihood. The estimated model is able to match the
general trends in the NLS data, particularly as related to the interaction between children,
savings and spending on education. The life-cycle paths of these choices suggest that
parents do save to help make sizeable transfers to their children, and that making such
choices endogenous is important. Furthermore, the parameter estimates indicate that the
amount that parents choose to contribute to a child’s education has a strong impact on the
probability that a child attains a college degree, as does the level of education of the
parents. Using the estimated model, policy experiments are performed to look at the
impact of additional government grants for college education, tax credits for college
spending and the creation of tax-free education savings accounts on parental savings,
contributions toward education, and the education attainment of children. While all of
the policies increase net contributions to children and increase the probability that a child
attains a college degree, the grants and education savings accounts are found to be the
most effective. In addition, both policies are actually found to have a greater impact on
children with less educated parents.
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1. Introduction
In the U.S., it is common for parents to help pay for their children’s college education
and for many families this is a major expense that they face and must plan for. The cost
of a college degree is also very large. The National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) reports that the average full price (including tuition, room, board and other
expenses as reported by universities) for a private 4-year school was $23,600 per year for
the 2000-2001 academic year (Berkner, Berker et al. 2002). The cost for a public 4-year
school was still $12,600.

Furthermore, these costs have been rising rapidly.

The

National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education between the 2001-2002
academic year and the 2002-2003 academic year, tuition levels have increased by 7
percent nationally, and by as much as 24 percent in Massachusetts and 20 percent in
Texas (Kronholz 2003). Certainly some of this is paid for by student aid through grants,
scholarships, and subsidized loans. Still, the NCES reports that 45 percent of students
receive no type of aid, either from grants, subsidized loans, or otherwise. McPherson and
Shapiro (1991) estimate that those receiving such aid, the aid only covers 75% of the cost
of public schooling and 50% of the cost of private schooling. As such, it does fall upon
the family to help pay for college expenses. Using data gathered by the NCES, Choy and
Henke (1992) find that in 1989, 67% of parents contributed to their children’s college
education and the average annual amount was $3,900 ($5,240 in 1999 dollars, adjusted
using the CPI).
Given the high costs of education, the fact that most children need support from
their parents to attain a college degree, and the importance of a college degree in
determining future earnings and productivity, there has been in recent years a push to
help parents pay for their children’s college education. In the last five years, there has
been an introduction of a variety of policies not only aiming to lower the cost of a degree
for some children, but also aiming to increase the amount that parents contribute toward
the college education of their children. Such parental contributions toward education can
have differing impacts on savings. First, it may increase savings early in life if parents
plan to spend money on their children’s education. Working in the other direction,
however, is the negative impact of the additional cost of raising children. Lastly, at the
time of the transfer and beyond, assets may change their rate of growth. To fully
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examine the impact of policies on parental contributions, then, it is necessary to consider
parents decisions on fertility, savings and college spending together.
This paper estimates a structural dynamic programming model of household
decisions on having children, saving and making transfers to children in the form of
educational funding. The model allows for households to face income uncertainty and
borrowing constraints, assumes that households save to smooth consumption.

In

choosing to have children, households gain in utility, but incur costs to raise children.
Additional utility is gained from having children receive a college degree, and parents
can influence this by offering to help pay for college. Taken together, there are several
motives for households to save:

precautionary, liquidity constrained, consumption

smoothing for retirement and the provision of inter-vivos transfers to children in the form
of paying for college. The model is estimated using a simulated maximum likelihood
procedure and data from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) young women cohort.
The estimated model is then used to examine policy experiments aimed to replicate an
increase in grants for children attending college, an increase in tax credit for parental
spending on education, and the creation of tax-free college savings accounts.
The second section of the paper presents a review of relevant previous studies to
give a background upon which the current model is based. The third section of the paper
describes the model and estimation procedure in detail. A general life-cycle model is
developed with the addition of choices on having children and helping to pay for their
education and a specification is presented that will be estimated here. The section also
discusses the issues associated with solving the model and the numerical technique used.
The section concludes with a description of the simulated maximum likelihood procedure
that is used to estimate the model. Section four describes the data, both in terms of how
the variables in the model are constructed and descriptive statistics of the sample used.
Section five presents the estimated parameter results and discusses the fit of the estimated
model. Section six provides a discussion of using the estimated model to examine policy
experiments aimed at capturing the impact of grants, tax credits and tax-free education
savings accounts on both parental contributions and the education attainment of their
children.
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2. Background and Previous Literature
The workhorse for economic research on household intertemporal savings and
consumption decisions is the life-cycle model. A very thorough review of the history of
these models and their ability to deal with observed microeconomic facts can be found in
Browning and Lusardi (1996). The life-cycle framework takes its original inspirations
from Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), but has evolved significantly through the years.
The basic underlying tenet of these models is that forward-looking households will try to
equate their marginal utilities across different periods by smoothing consumption across
their lifetime. The original framework progressed into what is widely referred to as the
Certainty-Equivalence (CEQ) model that dominated much of the research from the mid
1970’s through the late 1980’s.
The validity of the CEQ model has been debated and tested for years. Generally
speaking, there are several empirical shortcomings from the predictions of the CEQmodel (for summaries see Hubbard, Skinner et al. 1994; Browning and Lusardi 1996;
Coleman 1998). The additions of precautionary savings and liquidity constraints to the
life-cycle framework have been both successful and rather widely accepted
improvements in life-cycle models (see for example and review Hubbard, Skinner et al.
1994; Hubbard, Skinner et al. 1995). These models are complicated by the fact that they
can in general no longer be analytically solved and must therefore rely on numerical
solution techniques. Several sources of uncertainty confronting households have been
studied in these precautionary models. Early studies of precautionary savings allow for
earnings risk (Skinner 1988; Zeldes 1989; Caballero 1991; Deaton 1991), lifetime
uncertainty (Hubbard and Judd 1987; Hurd 1989) and even uncertainty regarding medical
expenses (Kotlikoff 1989). The general finding in these studies is that the precautionary
and liquidity constrained models do a better job of accounting for the micro facts in the
data than the CEQ model.

The borrowing constraint prevents households from

borrowing to consume more, even when that would be optimal, and this allows for an
increased correlation between income and consumption. Furthermore, the precautionary
motive encourages households to save a “buffer stock”.
While there is strong evidence that households do face liquidity constraints, the
previous discussion of the debate on this illustrates, there are other choices that

6

households make that are related to savings and consumtion decisions that are ignored
by life-cycle model. It has been pointed out (for example see Browning and Lusardi
1996; Keane and Wolpin 2001) that life cycle models really need to account for a whole
range of related behavior including not only consumptions and savings decisions but also
occupational (including work, leisure and retirement decisions) and fertility decisions. In
particular, findings that demographic equivalency scales can help reconcile model
predictions to the data, as noted by Attanasio and Browning (1995), indicate the
importance of family size in considering the evidence. However, as Keane and Wolpin
point out, such scales are “fundamentally arbitrary” and just indicate that standard models
can fit the data fairly well “by allowing for enough interactions between consumptions
and household demographics in the utility function (Keane and Wolpin 2001, p. 1058).”
In fact, a major shortcoming of life-cycle models when considering family size is that the
number and timing of children is either taken as given or as the result of a random,
exogenous process. Coleman claims the lack of allowing for “the endogeneity of the
overall relationship between family structure, family income, family consumptions and
age,” is one of the “greatest weakness[es] in the current state of theory (Coleman 1998, p.
8).” Furthermore, Browning and Lusardi add that it “would be extremely interesting to
extend these studies … to allow for the fact that, to a certain extent, agents choose … the
time path of demographics. Thus high education agents marry later and start their
families later which may be connected to their income processes (Browning and Lusardi
1996, pp. 1807-8).”
There can be no denying that the consumption and savings behavior of families
will differ depending on the number of children in the family. For starters, children
undoubtedly cost money. Using data from the 1990-1992 Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CES) and adjusting the amounts to 1997 dollars using the CPI, Lino (1998) calculates
the average annual expense for the younger child, under age 18, in a two-child household
for different household income brackets. He calculates the expense ranges from $5,820
to $6,880 depending on the age of the child (the amount increases as children grow) for
households with 1997 pre-tax income less than $35,5001. This average increases to a
1

The costs include data on child specific expenses on clothing, child care and education and estimated
portions of expenses on housing, transportation, food, health care and miscellaneous expenditures.
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range of $8,060 to $9,170 for households with income between $35,500 and $59,700
and to $11,990 to $13,260 for households with income greater than $59,700. These
amounts average 14% to 28% of a household’s pre-tax income depending on the pre-tax
income bracket of the household. These explicit costs, of course, do not include any
additional opportunity costs a household may incur from labor choices made in response
to raising children.
While both the intended or accidental transfers to children in the form of bequests
and whether households plan on receiving these bequest may be debatable, inter-vivos
transfers (transfers from parents to children while the parents are still living) must be
intended and the plans for such transfers are much more likely to be considered by the
recipients when making decisions.

These transfers often occur as gifts, paying for

college, or as help with a down payment on a house.

Using data from the 1983-1986

Survey of Consumer Finances, Gale and Scholz (1994) find that intended inter-vivos
transfers can make up approximately 20% of a household’s wealth. However, again,
these are often concentrated among the very wealthy. Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate
a model where young households receive transfers from parents (the process is random
but allowed to depend on several know factors) and find that inter-vivos wealth transfers
received by young households are significant. To the extent that such transfers do
account for wealth accumulation, they should be considered when modeling life-cycle
behavior, both for the parents and the children. Furthermore, these decisions are certainly
related to the choice of having children and represent a very complicated challenge to
model.
Transfers from parents to children often take the form of investments in human
capital. In particular, it is very common in the U.S. for parents to help pay for the postsecondary education of their children. These educational subsidies do not have some of
the divisive issues involved with the other wealth transfers discussed above. Helping pay
for college, like other inter-vivos transfers, is certainly intended by parents and not
accidental. Furthermore, since they are used toward paying the expenses of receiving an
education, they are not so much direct additions to the asset wealth of children as they are
an education subsidy and determinant in the future income path of children.

8

One reason for the prevalence of these transfers is the rising out-of-pocket
expense of college education in the U.S. Berkner et al. (2002), using data from the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), report that for that the average tuition
for private, not-for-profit, 4-year schools was $15,000 for the 1999-2000 academic year.
This was lower at other schools: $8,900 for private, for-profit institutions, $4,300 for
public 4-year institutions and $1,600 for public 2-year institutions.

The full price

including non-tuition expenses is much higher. The same study finds that for a full time
student, the average full price was $23,600 for private, not-for-profit, 4-year schools,
$18,400 for private, for-profit schools, $12,600 for public, 4-year schools and $9,100 for
public 2-year schools. These are obviously significant and large expenses.
Of course, these costs are not necessarily the out-of-pocket expense incurred by
students because many receive some assistance from grants, loans, and/or other forms of
financial aid. Berkner et al. (2002) find that for the 1999-2000 academic year, 27% of
students received some for of aid but not loans, 22% received subsidized loans and other
aid, and 7% received subsidized loans only. That still leaves 45% with no aid at all. The
percent will no aid falls to 28% when considering only full-time students, but that is still
a significant portion without aid. More importantly, the aid sources do not come close to
covering the full cost of education for most students. Berkner et al. (2002) calculate that
the average total aid for full time students receiving some form of aid at private, not-forprofit 4-year institutions in 1999-2000 was $11,600, and was $7,200 for students at
private, for profit schools, $6,200 for public 4-year schools and $2,300 for public 2-year
schools. These findings are consistent with McPherson and Shapiro (1991) who a decade
earlier found that 38% of students in public schools and 68% of those in private schools
received some form of aid but that on average it only covered 75% of public school
expenses and 50% of private school expenses.
The bottom line is that students still must cover large out-of-pocket expenses for
post-secondary education. Some of the money needed certainly comes from students’
own earnings and savings. In addition, many students receive financial support from
their parents, and these amounts can be large.

Using data from the National

Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), Lee (2001) finds that for the 1995-1996
academic year, 91.9% of undergraduate students attending schools with tuition and fees
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greater than $12,000 received some direct financial contribution from their parents.
This percentage was still high for students at schools with tuition and fees less than
$12,000: 79.6% for public research institutions and 70.8% for other institutions. Using
data gathered by the NCES, Choy and Henke (1992) found that in 1989, 67% of parents
contributed to their children’s college education and the average annual amount was
$3,900 ($5,240 in 1999 dollars, adjusted using the CPI). While the percentage of parents
contributing and the amounts they contribute have surely been increasing as college costs
have risen, these contributions have long been a significant source of funds for students.
Leslie (1984), using data from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP),
found that for the 1979-1980 academic year 47.6% of students received support from
their parents and the amount averaged $1,426 ($3,272 in 1999 dollars).
The out-of-pocket expenses that students must pay for a college education has
also motivated a wide variety of policies to help students pay afford a college degree.
Most government support in the form of the grants and loans previously discussed is
directly targeted at the student attending school. Several studies have tried to measure
the extent these programs help increase college attendance. For example, many argue
that an education subsidy should have a significant impact, especially if students tend to
face borrowing constraints. Using data from the introduction of the Georgia HOPE
scholarship program as a quasi-experiment, Dynarski (2000; 2002) finds the availability
of an additional $1,000 subsidy increases attendance by 4%. She also claims that this is
consistent with previous findings. Ichimura and Taber (2002) estimate a 4.5% increase in
attendance from the availability of a $1,000 subsidy. They estimate this using a reduced
form estimation derived from the model used by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and use the
same data as the Keane and Wolpin study. As discussed by Keane (2002), Keane and
Wolpin actually estimate that a $100 tuition increase (a negative subsidy) would lower
enrollment rates of 18-24-year-olds by 1.2%. Interestingly, Keane and Wolpin, while
finding that borrowing constraints are indeed tight for students (they can not even support
one year from borrowing alone), they do not find that allowing for easier loan access will
increase attendance. Instead, they find that the major impact of reducing the borrowing
constraint is in a reduction of working by students. Perhaps more importantly, they do
find that parental transfers contingent on college attendance significantly increase the
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educational attainment of children, which is consistent with the findings that subsidies
increase attendance.
In recent years, several policies have been created to help parents pay for the
college education of their children. That is, policies where the goal is to increase the
amounts parents contribute toward their children’s education. The Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 created several such policies.

The first two are tax breaks.

The Hope

Scholarship Credit is a tax credit for 100% of the first $1,000 of qualified tuition
expenses and 50% of the next $1,000 of qualified tuition expenses. This is only available
in the first two years of post-secondary education and is phased out at higher incomes
($40,000-$50,000 for individual taxpayers, twice that for married households). The
credit can be claimed for expenses for yourself or a dependant. Hence, parents can claim
it for college expenses paid for their dependant children. The Lifetime Learning Credit is
similar except that it is available for any year of education (not just the first two years)
but is for 20% of up to $5,000 in expenses (this will increase to $10,000 in 2003). Also,
the Hope Scholarship Credit can be claimed for each child supported separately but the
Lifetime Learning credit is a per family credit. The act also set up an educational savings
account, originally often referred to as an educational IRA. This is really just a custodial
account for children under 18 for which the earnings and distributions are tax-free as long
as they are used for qualified education expenses. However, originally no more than
$500 may was allowed be put into the account per-year and even this is phased out at
higher income levels. This amount increased to $2,000 in 2002 and the program was
renamed the Coverdell Education Savings Account. An additional type of savings plan
that was created are 529 plans (also created in 1997, they are named for the IRS tax code
that allows for favorable tax treatment to qualified state tuition programs) which are
actually run by states. Since they are administered by states, the details can vary some
from state to state but in general there are two types of 529 plans. The first type is a
prepaid tuition plan. In these plans, money is contributed in a child’s name and locks in
an associated percentage of college expenses at current tuition rates at one of the state’s
public universities. If you choose to use the money somewhere other than one of the
state’s public schools, you will get the amount you contributed to the account, but often
without any earnings. As such, these plans are really just hedging against rapid rises in
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college tuition. The other type of 529 plan is a college savings plan. These accounts
accept contributions that can grow tax-free until distribution. Starting in 2002, withdraws
were also allowed to be tax-free. Specific limits vary by states, but at the federal level all
contributions are treated under the gift tax laws, which are not triggered until gifts exceed
$10,000. Starting in 2002, families were also allowed to switch between different types
of 529 plans. More recently, President Bush’s budget proposal for 2003 includes the
creation new education savings accounts that would replace the Coverdell accounts and
allow for $7,500 in contributions per year.
The model and work presented here builds upon the above strains of literature in
several important ways. First, the choice to have children, the number of children to have
and the timing of when to have children are all made as endogenous decisions within the
life-cycle framework. Furthermore, families are allowed to choose to make transfers to
their children in the form of educational subsidies. Together, this allows for a rich
relationship between the number of children to have, how much to provide these children
with a form of inter-vivos transfers, and savings and consumption within the life-cycle.
The educational subsidies in the model will also provide a way to conduct policy
simulations to look at predicted impacts of programs aimed at getting parents to
contribute more toward their children’s education.
3. The Model
3.1 The General Model
This section develops a general model to look at household consumption and savings
decisions along with choices on how many children to have and how much to spend on
children’s college education. A key feature of the model, unlike previous models looking
at household savings interacted with the number of children in the household, is that the
number of children in a household is an endogenous choice. The model is a based on a
household dynamic programming problem. Households have a lifespan of T periods and
face earnings uncertainty throughout their life. In each period households choose how
much to consume and how much to save. In addition, younger households must also
decide how many children to have, and households with college-age children must decide
how much money to contribute to their children’s education.
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To make these decisions, households maximize their expected discounted
utility. Each household’s contemporaneous utility for a period depends on both the level
of consumption and the number of children in the family. Furthermore, households
receive additional utility as their children become more educated. A household’s utility
for any given period, t, is then in general given by
U (ct , nt , e1t , e2t ,..., e Et , ε ct , ε nt , ε et )

(1)

where U(.) is the utility function, ct is consumption at time t, nt is the total number of
children at time t, ejt is the number of children with education level j at time t where j is
one of E education levels (j=1,…,E), and εct is a consumption taste shock at time t, εnt is a
taste shock to the number of children at time t, and εet is a taste shock to the education
levels at time t.
In each period, households choose a level of consumption and savings.
Households can also have children in periods 1 through T*, and so must also choose how
many additional children to have in each of those periods. As stated previously, children
may add to a household’s utility both directly and through the amount of education they
attain. There are also, however, costs to having children. While children live at home,
the household incurs a cost of Ψ per child. All children are assumed to live at home for
M periods, at which time they move out.
When a child moves out at age M+1, the household has the option to contribute
money toward his or her college education. At this time, the household chooses a onetime offer, ot, of a per-year amount to contribute toward the child’s college education.
Given this offer, the child then attains a certain an education level. From the household’s
view, a child’s education level is a realization of a stochastic process that depends on the
amount of support offered by the household, along with other possible observably
demographic variables. For the household, letting djt be the education level child j
receives in period t,

d jt ~ D(d jt | w jt )

(2)
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so that djt is a realization of the conditional distribution D(djt|wjt) where wjt is a vector
including the amount offered by the household to child j, along with other possible
factors including a family type effect. The amount the household actually pays toward a
child’s college education is then a product of the per-year offer made and the number of
years of schooling the child attends.
Throughout their lives, households face an uncertain income stream. In any given
period t, a household earns a specific amount of income, It. This amount of income is a
realization of a random process that may depend on certain household characteristic such
as level of education. The process differs before and after retirement and all households
are assumed to retire at age T**. As such, It is a realization,
 H (I t | Z t )
It ~ 
 H ret (I t | Z t , I 1 , I 2 ,..., I T **−1 )

if t < T**
if t ≥ T**

(3)

where Zt is a vector of household characteristics and H(.|.) and Hret(.|.) are the appropriate
distributions of income before and after retirement.
The households’ problem, then, is to solve
T
E ∑ δ
{c1 ...cT , n1 ,..., nT ,oM +1 ,...,oT }  t =1

max


U (ct , nt , e1t , e2t ,..., e Et , ε ct , ε nt , ε et )


t −1

(4)

where δ is the discount rate. The maximization is made subject to
Nt

ct = k t (1 + r ) + I t − n ht Ψ − ∑ a nt − k t +1

(5)

n =1

where kt is the level of household assets at time t, r is the real interest rate, nht is the
number of children living at home at time t, ant is the amount the household pays toward
child n’s college expenses at time t and the remaining variables are defined as mentioned
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previously. The expectation is over the taste shocks to consumption, children, their
educational attainment and the realizations of future income and children’s educational
attainment. To implement this model, then, what remains is to detail specifications for
the utility function, the random taste shocks, the income and children’s educational
attainment processes, and to set values for the number of periods, T, the retirement age
T**, the age through which households may have children, T*, the number of periods
children live at home, M, and the different levels of education that children may attain.
These details, along with a method to both solve the model and to estimate the model
parameters are laid out in the next sections.
3.2 Model Specification
I now turn to a full specification of the general model. The specification will allow the
model to be solved and subsequently estimated using the NLS data described in section
four. In particular, specifications are needed for the utility function, the random taste
shocks, the income and children’s educational attainment processes, the parental offer
process, and to set values for the number of periods, T, the retirement age T**, the age
through which households may have children, T*, the number of periods children live at
home, M, and the different levels of education that children may attain.
A period in the model is assumed to last 6 years. Since assets evolve slowly
over time the assumption of such a long period should not significantly impact the
results2. The maximum age, T, is set to 12 giving households an adult lifespan of 72
years (corresponding to ages 18 to 90). Households are assumed to retire at age 66, so
T** is set to 9.
Households may choose to have children during any of the first three periods,
after which they no longer have children, so T* is set to 3.

This implies that all

households have all their children by an age of 36. In addition, households are restricted
to having no more than 4 children in any one period, and no more than 5 children in total.
These restrictions impact only a small portion of the data and significantly ease the
2

As will be seen later in the paper, the 6-year period also closely corresponds with the frequency that asset
information is collected in the data and the general biennial data collection for the NLS. Furthermore, the
longer periods will greatly reduce the computational complexity of the model solution.
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computational burden of solving the model.

Within the NLS data (the data are

described in detail in a later section), only 7.18% of households have children when older
than 36, so this is not too stringent a limitation. Furthermore, only 1.94% had more than
4 children in any single six-year period and only 4.27% had more than 5 children. In all,
only 10.78% of the NLS sample violates one or more of these three restrictions (i.e. had
more than 4 children in a given 6-year period, had more than 5 children in total and/or
had children after the age of 36).
Children are assumed to move out after 3 periods at home, so M is set to 3. This
corresponds to children moving out at age 18. Actually, this assumption just means that
the household incurs a cost of raising a child for only 3 periods. In the period a child
moves out (the 4th period of a child’s life), the household has the option to help pay for
that child’s college education.

It is assumed that households only make these

contributions in the period that their children move out.

This assumption again

significantly eases the computability of the solution and does not impact very many
households. In fact, in the NLS data only 14.45% of children attending school received
support after age 24, and for most of these that support came within the next two years.
When making an offer of financial support for college education, households are
restricted to make the same offer to all children moving out in a given period. This
assumption allows for the identification of the impact offers make on how much
schooling children receive. This is necessary because what are reported in the data are
the amounts parents actually contributed toward their children’s education. Obviously,
then, there is no data on this for children who did not go to college and yet it is probable
that some these children would have received some support from their parents. The
assumption here is that those children receive the same offer of support as their siblings
attending school within the same period.

The data suggest that this is not overly

restrictive. Again when looking at the NLS data, within a period, most families do not
greatly vary the amount they contribute toward their different children. In fact, 50.5%
made contributions that differed by less than $1,000 and almost 20% of contributions
differed by less than $50.
The restriction that children born within the same period receive the same offer,
while providing identification for the impact of the offer, does imply that if offers
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positively impact the educational attainment of children, then one should observe that
on average, when comparing families with the same number of children, the families with
more children in college will be making larger contributions toward their children’s
education. It is not obvious that this should be the case because, for example, a family
with two children and both of them in college at the same time may have less money
available to support either individually than if just one was attending college. The data,
though, do support the assumption and its implication. Looking at the NLS data, for
families with two children born within six years of each other, the average per-child, peryear contribution in 1999 dollars is $5,721 for those with both children attending college,
and only $3,666 for those with just one child in college.
The stochastic process that determines the level of education a child receives, that
is dtj~D(dtj|wtj), is assumed to be an ordered probit. The vector of factors, wtj, includes a
quadratic in the family contribution offer and the level of the parents’ education. It is
assumed that the outcome is one of three discrete outcomes dtj ∈ {low, medium, high}.
These low, medium and high outcomes correspond to high school or less, some postsecondary education or a 2-year degree, and a bachelor’s or higher degree.3
The household contemporaneous utility function for any period is assumed to take
the form

(cε )

1− γ

U ( c , n, q m , q h , ε c , ε n , ε q ) =

c

1−γ

+ (λ1 + λ 2 n + ε n )n +

(6)

(α 1 + α 2 q m + ε q )q m + (θ 1 + θ 2 q h + ε q )q h

which combines a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function for
consumption with additively separate quadratic utility in the number of children, the
number of children with some college education and the number of children with a
bachelor’s or higher degree.

The utility parameters for children and education are

allowed some heterogeneity with respect to different education levels, and the child
parameters are allowed to further vary in the first three periods.
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The shocks for each period are drawn as follows. In every period, εct, is drawn from an

iid lognormal distribution with log mean zero and εnt and εqt are drawn from zero mean iid
normal distributions, so that
ln (ε ct ) ~ N (0, σ c2 ), ε nt ~ N (0, σ n2 ), ε qt ~ N (0, σ q2 ) .

(7)

Household income is assumed to be determined by,
 exp{Z t β + ε I t }

1 T **−1
It = 
b **
∫ exp{Z t β + ε I t }dΦ(ε I t ) + ε rt
 T − 1 ∑
t =1

if t < T * *
if t ≥ T * *

(8)

where the characteristic vector Zt contains dummies for the levels of education and
marital status interacted with a quadratic in age.

The exponential specification for

earnings leads to a standard wage equation where ln(wt) = Ztβ + εIt for pre-retirement
income. Post-retirement income is then a certain percentage, b, of the average expected
pre-retirement income.

The pre-retirement and post-retirement income shocks are

assumed to be distributed by zero mean iid normal distributions so

εIt ~ N(0 ,σI2) and εrt ~ N(0 ,σr2).

(9)

While earnings certainly may be argued to show some short-term persistence, the iid
assumption is not unreasonable for the longer six-year periods of this model.
Because the impact of marital transitions is not a focus of this paper, marital
status is assumed to be constant over the agent’s life. Without this assumption, changes
from single to married and vice versa will be accompanied by shocks to not only income
but to assets as well. In addition, the decisions to marry and divorce and the separate
contributions toward their children’s education from divorced couples would also need to
be modeled. Assuming a constant marital status allows for a simpler model that focuses
on the household savings and educational transfer decisions. This clearly will limit the
sample this model is applied to, which will be outlined in more detail later. The level of
3

In addition, limiting the number of outcomes to three will greatly ease the computation burden of solving
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education of the household for earnings consideration is also a constant in this model.
As such, both marital status and education are assumed to be a constant family type.
Finally, households are also assumed to face the following constraints:
ct ≥ 0, ∀t
k t ≥ 0 ∀t
nt + 4 ≥ nt +1 ≥ nt ∀t

(10)

nt ≤ 5 ∀t

4n 4 t ot ∈ [0, (1 + rk )k t + I t − nhtψ ] ∀t

where n4t is the number of children of age 4 in period t and ot is the per-year, per-child
offer. The first two conditions imply that households have positive consumption and that
they cannot take out uncollateralized loans. The third condition restricts households to
have no more than four additional children in a period and that the number of children
cannot decrease. The fourth restriction is the maximum family size of five children.
Lastly, the offer is restricted so that it must be non-negative and, because the offer is
binding, a household is not allowed to offer more than can be covered without taking out
an uncollateralized loan.
The timing of the model is outlined in figures 1-3. At the beginning of each
period the household receives a realization of εct, εnt, εqt, and εIt or εrt. After the
realization of these shocks, the household then receives their income and pays out
expenses for children living at home. The household then makes decisions for the period.
In the first three periods, the choices of an amount to save and the number of children to
have in that period are made simultaneously. In periods 4-6, if the agent has children
who are of college age, the educational support offer and the savings decisions are made
sequentially. Parents first choose a per-child, per-year amount to offer their children in
educational support. Parents then realize the outcomes of their children’s education
choices and make the appropriate payments. Finally, the household chooses a level of
savings and consumption.
3.3 Solving the Model

the model.

The household optimization problem can be rewritten recursively. Let s ∈ S where S is
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the state space and s is a specific point within the state space. In every period the
household chooses some level of consumption and savings, given their state variables.
At the same time, if the household is of the appropriate age, they also choose the number
of additional children to add to the family. I will refer to these decisions as the primary
problem. In periods 4, 5 and 6, the household may also solve another problem, the offer
to children. Sequentially, a household solves the offer problem at the beginning of the
applicable period and then solves the primary problem for that period after observing the
education outcomes of their children. In all other periods, the household just solves the
primary problem. Let Ot(s) be the value of entering the offer problem at age t with state s
and let Vt(s) be the value of entering the primary problem at age t with state s. Ot(s) is the
solution to
Ot ( s ) = max Ed [Vt ( s ' ) | o, s ]

if have children to make offer to

Ot ( s ) = Vt ( s )

otherwise

o

(17)

subject to (5)-(16), where the expectation is taken with respect to the educational
outcome of the children. Vt(s) can now be written as the solution to

{U (ct , nt , q mt , q ht , ε ct , ε nt , ε ht ) + δE[Ot +1 ( s' ) | s ]} if t = 3,4,5
Vt ( s ) = max
c , k ', n '
Vt ( s ) = max`` {U (ct , nt , q mt , q ht , ε ct , ε nt , ε ht ) + δE [Vt +1 ( s ' ) | s ]} otherwise

(18)

c , k ', n '

subject to (5)-(16) where a “ ′ ” on a variable indicates the value in the next period. The
expectations here are taken with respect to εc, εn, εq and εI or εr. It is assumed that VT+1(s)
= 0. In most periods, then, the household just goes from solving the primary problem in
one period to solving it again in the next period. After periods 3, 4, and 5, however, the
household first solves the offer problem and then proceeds to solve the primary problem
for that period.
The state space for the for a household is S = K × N × N × N × Q × Q where k is
the level of assets, k ∈ K ⊂ R+ , nt is the number of children born in period,

nt ∈ N={0,1,…,4}and qjt is the number of children of education level j in period t,
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qjt ∈ Q={0,1,…,5}. Since the household education level and marital status do not change,
they can be suppressed from the state space and the model solved separately for type.
Age is a state variable, but the period subscripts capture that so it is not listed in the
vector s.
In making their decisions, households actually use the level of disposable cashon-hand, and not the asset level directly. Let xt be the amount of disposable cash-onhand. At the beginning of every period,
xt = (1+rk)kt-1 + It – nhtψ.

(19)

Within the periods that the offer and savings problems are both solved, xt updates by
subtracting the amount that was spent on college.
The model can be solved as a finite horizon dynamic programming problem.
Given a set of parameter values, the direct way to solve a finite-horizon problem is to
solve the problem for every possible combination of state points backwards from the final
period to the initial period. However, this method is not a practical option when the
number of state points becomes too many or when there are continuous variables in the
state space. The reason is that there is a "curse of dimensionality" due to the fact that the
number of combinations of state points grows too large or even infinite so that computing
a solution for each one is not possible. This is compounded by the fact that multiple
integration over the random shocks is necessary at each step to get the expected value
functions (EMAX), (i.e. the expectations in (17) and (18).)
The specification assumptions used here that limiting the number of children and
the number of periods that families can have children help limit the number of
combinations of children born at different periods and their educational attainment in the
state space to a manageable number. As outlined previously, these restrictions on the
choice set only impact a small portion of the data, and they clearly ease the computation
of a model solution. However, since assets are a continuous variable, the solution still
cannot be calculated for every state variable combination. Even if assets were to be
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discretized in a reasonable way, the resulting state space would still be huge. As such,
the model here clearly still suffers from a curse of dimensionality.
One method of overcoming this is to utilize an estimate for the integration
involved in the expectations and to solve the model for a subset of the possible state
points and interpolate for the remaining values of the EMAX. Keane and Wolpin (1994)
propose using Monte Carlo integration to evaluate the expectations in the EMAX and
interpolating over a subset of state points for which the model is solved using least
squares. They offer extensive Monte Carlo simulations showing the effectiveness of this
method. The solution technique used here follows the Keane-Wolpin methodology. The
model will be solved for every possible combination of the discrete state variables (the
number of children in each period and their education levels) but for each of these
combinations I will only directly solve for a subset of asset values. The expectations are
approximated using Monte Carlo integration and the EMAX functions will be
interpolated at the remaining asset levels using least squares. For (18) the interpolation is
the regression of directly solved EMAX values on the contemporary utility evaluated at
the means of the stochastic components and for (17) the optimal offers are regressed on
assets (Keane and Wolpin, 1994).
3.4 Estimation
The model is estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood4. The solution to the
dynamic programming problem provides the input into estimating the likelihood. For
each individual, this problem is deterministic, but from the economists view it is
probabilistic because we do not observe the contemporaneous shocks.

As such, a

likelihood function can be constructed and estimated based on the outcomes predicted by
the model solution at different parameter values.
Several previous studies have utilized a similar estimation procedure for discrete
choice models (Stern 1994; Keane and Wolpin 1997; 2001). Keane and Wolpin (2001)
develop an expanded approach for a model that maintains a discrete choice set but allows
for additional continuous and unobserved outcome variables, such as income. They

4

For a good summary of simulation based estimation techniques, see Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).
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accomplish this with an innovative use of assuming there is measurement error for the
unobserved variables. With discrete choice models the likelihood is composed of the
probabilities of the different choices occurring. Simulated probability estimators utilizing
simulated samples generated from the model are used to estimate these probabilities and
therefore generate the likelihood which is maximized (for examples of such simulators
see McFadden 1989; Geweke, Keane et al. 1994; Stern 1994; Keane and Wolpin 1997).
Since the model in this paper contains continuous choices, the exact same procedure
cannot be followed. However, the same concept applies, but instead of probability
simulators I use nonparametric a density estimator is used with simulated samples to
construct the elements of the likelihood.
Consider a single household, i, from the data. A sequence of state points for this
household (and hence the decisions they made) is observed. Since the decisions made in
the model depend only on the current state variable and exogenous, independently
distributed shocks, household i’s contribution to the likelihood, Li can be rewritten as a
sequence of conditional densities:
T −1

Li =

∏ f (s

i
t +1

| sti )

(20)

t =0

where f(.) is the pdf of st+1 conditional on st. The sample likelihood is then calculated as
the product of these individual likelihoods.
A problem remains in calculating the likelihood because the functional fomr of
f(.) is unknown. However, given a set of the parameters, the model can be solved and
therefore a sample of values for st+1 given a value of st can be simulated. From this
sample, then, a density estimator can be calculated and used to estimate the value of
f(st+1|st). Several smooth density estimators have been proposed and used for discrete
choice models in a setting such as this (e.g. McFadden 1989; Geweke, Keane et al. 1994;
Stern 1994; Keane and Wolpin 1997). These methods consist of using some sort of
smoothed probability estimator of the probabilities of the different finite (discrete)

outcomes occurring5. However, the model here involves a continuous choice in assets.
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One possible way to deal with this is to discretize assets. Yet, the model and solution
methods have been constructed to preserve a continuous choice in assets. An alternative,
then, is to use a continuous density estimator. This is the approach that I take in
estimating the model.
There is a wide literature on density estimation and techniques for continuous
and mixed variable distributions (for a summary see Silverman 1986). Because of the
maximization problem involved, a smooth density estimator is important here, and I will
use a smooth kernel density estimator. In using a continuous variable, though, the
density is no longer the probabililty of one outcome resulting from a finite number of
choices. Instead, the continuous or mixed density of the next period state space must be
estimated.

Furthermore, the dimension of the state space becomes important.

Unfortunately, traditional kernel estimators are notoriously innacuarate and difficult (if
not impossible) to implement when used in higher dimension space. Since the state space
here is certainly multidimensional, this must be addressed.
Given the specific model here, it turns out that no more than two observed state
space values change between any two observed periods in which the estimated density
must be calculated. The remaining values are fixed. As such, it is never necessary to
estimate a joint density for more than two variables. For example, after period six, the
number of children and their education levels are all fixed so just assets change. As such,
the conditional density for these periods is just the one-dimensional conditional density of
next period assets given current assets. In the education periods, 4-6, the number of
children is fixed, but there is an offer decision, and education levels and assets are
changing. However, this process is sequential in the model: first an offer is made, then
educational outcomes are realized conditional on this offer, and then savings decisions
are made. As such, there are really three independent conditional densities for these
periods, one of offer given the initial state, the next of educational outcomes given the
5

Several of the previous estimates of discrete choice models referenced above have constructed their
density estimates based on the fact that a certain set of observed outcomes (state space values) is the result
of the value function evaluated at those outcomes being the greatest among the finite (dicrete) options
available. As such, the probabilities can be calculated from simulating the probability the value function is
greatest for these choices.
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offer and the initial state, and finally of savings given the initial state and educational
outcomes. So again, only a one-dimensional density estimator is needed for the offer and
asset updates, and a two-dimensional estimator for the educational outcomes for changes
in the number of children with some college or a four-year degree. In the first three
periods, the education levels are constant, as are the number of children born in any
period except the current one. So, only the number of children in the current period and
savings are being decided upon. As such, again only a bivariate density estimator is
needed for these periods.
The specific density estimators that I use are as follows. In general, a univariate
kernel density estimate is calculated from

1 n
fˆ ( s ) =
∑ K (s, Si , h )
nh i =1

(21)

where s is the data point at which the density is to be calculated, n is the number of data
points in the data sample, Si is the ith observation in the data sample and h is a smoothing
parameter. The function K(.) is the kernel function and the resulting fˆ is the estimate for
the true density, f. When a univariate continuous density estimator is needed, in periods
seven and beyond (for assets) and in the offer portion of periods four through six (for the
offer value), I use a standard Gaussian Kernel. As such the kernel function is

K (s , S i , h ) =

 1  s − Si  
exp − 
 
2π
 2 h  
1

2

(22)

and for the smoothing parameter I use Silverman’s (1986) plug in value for an optimal
window width for the Gaussian kernel
h = 1.06σˆn −1 / 5

(23)
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where σˆ is the standard deviation of the variable in the sample data. This choice of a

value for the smoothing parameter (or slight variants) is also proposed and discussed in
Härdle (1991) and Scott (1992). In a comparative simulation study of kernel methods,
Bowman (1985) finds that such a plug-in parameter selection, while simple, performed
very well even when compared to more advanced smoothing parameter selection
methods.
For the bivariate densities I use a bivariate product kernel (Scott 1992) which in
general takes the form

fˆ ( s1 , s2 ) =

1
nh1h2

n

∑ K (s , S
i =1

1

1

i1

, h1 )K 2 (s2 , S i 2 , h2 ) .

(24)

When the bivariate estimates are needed, however, they are either for either two discrete
variables (educational outcomes when appropriate in periods 4-6) or mixed with a
continuous variable (assets) and a discrete variable (new children) in periods 1-3. For the
continuous portion I again use a standard Gaussian kernel as described in (18)-(19). For
the discrete values, a variety of smooth kernel estimators could be used. Notice, though,
that the variables here (number of children and number of children with certain
educational outcomes) are not just categorical, but are ordered and the values matter. For
example, having three children is closer to the choice of having two children than say
having five children. To take advantage of this, I utilize a variant of the Habbema kernel
which was found to be highly effective by Titterington and Bowman (1985) with
K ( s, S i , h ) = λ

s − Si

(25)

where λ is a smoothness parameter. In this kernel the traditional smoothness weight, h, is
set to
J −1

h = ∑λj
j =0

(26)
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where J is the number of discrete distances possible between s and other data points in
the sample and acts just as an appropriate weight. The amount of smoothing is then
controlled by λ, which is set to 0.36.
So the estimation procedure works as follows. First, an initial guess of the
parameters is made.

The model is solved for these parameters.

The value of the

likelihood function is constructed using the simulated density estimation just described.
The likelihood is checked to see if it is maximized, if it is not, the guess is updated and
the procedure repeats itself. The parameters are updated for the maximization routing
using a version of a simplex algorithm originally proposed by Nelder and Mead (1965).
and discussed in Acton (1990).

4. The Data

The data are taken from the young women cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey
(NLS). The young women cohort of the NLS consists of 5,159 women who were 14-24
years old in 1968. Surveys were administered every year from 1968 through 1973 and
then basically every other year since then. The original cohort sample is based on a core
random sample and an over-sample of blacks. While the NLS collects data on a wide
variety of topics, the relevant information used in this analysis is data on assets, income,
children, education, marital status, children’s education and spending on children’s
education. The data used here are from 1968-1999.
4.1 Sample and variable definitions.
Periods in the model are specified to be six years long. When matching this with the
data, the first period is matched to ages 18-23 in a household’s life, the second ages 24-29
and so on. The age of the household is measured as the age of the women followed in the
NLS data.
6

Setting λ=0 results in a histogram and setting λ=1 results in an equal density estimate of 1/J for all values.
0.3 is utilized by Titterington and Bowman (1985) and as with their studies, I find that changing this within
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Comprehensive questions on assets were asked in 1968, 1971-1973, 1978,
1983, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999.

Asset information obtained includes

information about housing, mortgages, savings, stocks, bonds, vehicles, business, farm or
real estate assets and outstanding debts. For analysis with the model above, assets are
measured as total net household assets, excluding vehicles. If more than one observation
of assets is available within the appropriate age range for a period for a household (which
is the case when assets information is collected regularly), the earlier dated value is used
because the model treats the assets of a period as the assets available to the household
when entering that period.
Income information is collected with every survey, but the level of detail varies
some between years. Income questions cover wages of the respondent and spouse,
business or farm income, rental income, unemployment compensation, disability income,
welfare, income of other family members and other income. In some years, separate
questions on interest and dividend income, food stamps, alimony and child support,
social security and pension income and assistance from relatives were also asked.
Income in the model is measured as the total income of a woman and her spouse. To fit
with the six-year periods, the income amount is calculated as six times the average of the
annual income observations within the appropriate age range.
Educational information about the respondents is collected in every survey.
Information on the highest grade attended is collected and updated every survey. In
addition, in 1983 questions were asked on whether the respondent had earned a high
school diploma or GED and if so when. This information was then updated in all
subsequent surveys for those respondents who attended school since the last interview.
Finally, information on the highest degree received was collected in the initial year and
updated in every subsequent interview for those who had received a degree since the last
interview. Information on the level of education of spouses is also collected. The level
of education enters the model in two ways. First, it is a factor in the wage equation.
Second, it is a factor in the level of education attained by children in the household.
Also, the model assumes that the level of education is constant for a household’s lifetime.
a reasonable range does not qualitatively impact the estimates. For more discussion on kernel methods for
discrete distributions refer to Aitken (1983).
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The household education level is therefore measured as the highest level of education
attained by either parent in a household. The measured education level of a household is
then grouped into one of two categories, those with a college degree, and those without.
So, there are in essence two education “types” of households. The limit to two education
categories is because the sample sizes within education groups become rather small when
more categories are used, and because the estimation technique takes multiplicatively
longer for each additional education level.
Marital status is asked in every interview and in most surveys the marital history
since the last interview is updated. As with the level of education, marital status is
assumed to be constant in the model. I classify a household as married in the model if the
woman is married before age 36 and in no subsequent interview after getting married are
they no longer married. In similar fashion, someone never married is considered single.
However, in this cohort, the number of women who were never married and also satisfy
the other data assumptions and restrictions is extremely small. Because of this, I will
only consider stable, married households. As such, the results in actuality can only be
claimed to be attributed to such stable and married households.
In every interview, detailed information is collected for each of the respondent’s
children living in the household. This information includes among other things, the
child’s age. In addition, in 1978 information on the age of up to eight children born by
1978 was collected. Similar information followed in 1983 for children born between
1978 and 1983. In 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1999 the information was collected
for children born since the last interview. Furthermore, in 1999 a full child roster was
collected which includes children’s birth-dates, and level of education.

From this

information, children can be grouped into being born in the first, second or third period of
the model and the appropriate educational attainment category can also be assigned for
each child. As was explained in detailing the model specification, the model assumes
households can only have children in the first three six-year periods, and that they have
no more than five children, and no more than four within a given period. As was
mentioned when discussing these restrictions in the specification, only 10.78% of the
NLS sample violates one or more of these three restrictions and will not be used. This
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restriction, while perhaps not a large loss of data, should be kept in mind when
considering the types of households for which the results are estimated.
Beginning in 1991 and subsequently in 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999, the survey
includes questions about the college enrollment of children and the amount of financial
support the parent’s provided toward college for each child within the past twelve
months. The offer in the model is assumed to be the same for all children born in the
same period, as was described earlier along with the reasons for this assumption and
appropriateness of the assumption.

The offer is measured as the average annual

contribution parents made toward post-secondary education for children born in the
appropriate period. Unfortunately, the only data collected on parent’s contributions is the
biennial question about how much was contributed within the last 12 months. There is
not data on the total amount spent on a child’s post-secondary education. Some measure
of this is needed to update the household assets level for the total amount parents spend to
assist their children’s education. This amount will be computed as 4 times the offer for
those children within the four-year college degree education category, and 2 times the
offer for those children within the some college education category. This is not an
amount matched to any particular figure in the data, but is used to update the household’s
evolving assets.
As mentioned previously, the original NLS young women cohort sample began
with 5,159 women of ages 14-24 years old when the initial data collection began in 1968.
For analysis with the model in this paper, this set is restricted to those women who
remained in the data set through 1999 and reported information on all the necessary and
relevant variables. One impact of this is that it somewhat overly excludes the older
women in the sample. This is because data on contributions toward their children’s
education was only gathered starting in 1991. Therefore, some of these women had
children already educated before any information on their contributions was collected.
However, there is no reason to suspect that these women are significantly different from
the younger women in the cohort so this should not be a problem. The sample is further
limited to those women who meet the stable marriage criteria outlined above. Lastly,
given the size of the sample and the likely measurement error that accounts for extremely

high and low reported assets levels, outlier observations were deleted.7 This leaves a
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sample of 556 households with 3,139 household-period observations.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the sample breakdown between of the average number of children for
different levels of household education. Less educated households have more children,
averaging 2.395 per household versus 2.208 for households with a college degree. Not
surprisingly, the timing of when to have children is also very different. College educated
households have very few children, only 0.476 on average, during ages 18 through 23.
Conversely, this is when households without a college degree have the most children,
averaging 1.225 children per household born during ages 18 through 23.

At older age

ranges, however, it is the college-educated households who have more children. During
ages 30-35, college educated households have an average of 0.759 children, while those
without a college degree have only 0.344.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the asset accumulation of households at
different ages and by differing levels of education. Since the oldest in the cohort are just
now reaching their mid-to-late fifties, the accumulation pattern is just increasing through
the years. In fact, the accumulation is very rapid from an average of just over $4,000 in
1999 dollars at ages 18-23 to an average of $218,947 for when reaching ages 48-53. The
amount of assets is greater for those with a college degree and the accumulation even
more rapid. Still, for those with no more than a high school degree, average assets grow
from $4,431 when 18-23 to over $170,000 by the time they reach ages 54-59. As usual,
the asset distribution is largely skewed toward high values as is shown by the much lower
median asset values. For the entire sample, the median asset level grows from a mere
956 when aged 18-23 to $145,000 when reaching ages 54-59.
The percent of households with negative asset values is also listed in Table 2.
Ten percent of the sample lists negative asset levels at ages 18-23 but this progressively
declines to only 3.6 percent when aged 42-47 and 1.89 percent by ages 48-53. The
percentage declines less steadily through the years for households without a college
7

The upper and lower truncation points differed for each period. In total, 21 observations from below and
28 from above were cut.
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degree, but still is never greater than just over ten percent. Perhaps more significantly,
the average value of assets for those with a negative asset level is never very far from
zero, ranging from just less than $-1,000 to just under $-3,000.

So while some

percentage of households do have negative net assets, this percentage becomes more
negligible as households age, and the negative amount does not tend to fall much below
zero. This is consistent with previous research on the liquidity constraints on households
(see for example Keane and Wolpin 2001) and is not too far from the constraint against
non-collateralized loans in the model estimated here, particularly after period one.
Figure 4 breaks down household asset accumulation by the number of children
parents have over their lifetime. As shown in the top panel, the most striking feature is
that households without children accumulate assets more slowly in early years, but then
at a much more rapid pace so that by their late forties, households with no children have
more assets on average. In fact, at young ages households with no children have the
fewest assets, but by their late forties, these households have the highest average asset
level. The general pattern for households with children is to accumulate assets at a
quickening pace until their early thirties, to slow asset accumulation during their thirties,
but then resume at a more rapid pace in their mid-forties. Households with 1-3 children
have significantly more assets than those with four or five children. This pattern is
similarly repeated when separating households with a college degree from those without
as is done in the lower two panels of figure 4. The observed asset accumulation pattern is
certainly consistent with households saving more to cover the cost of children and then
slowing their asset accumulation while incurring expenses associated with children.
While this is certainly optional for parents to help pay for a college education,
most households do contribute toward their children’s education and the amounts are
significant. Table 3 presents information about the amount of money families spend on
their children’s college education. For the entire sample, 81.7 percent of households with
children attending college helped pay for college. Furthermore, the average per-year
contribution made by those who did help financially support their children was $5,230 in
1999 dollars. The percentage or parents who help support their children in college rises
to just under 95 percent for households with a college degree. Even for households with
no more than a high school degree, the percentage remains high at 67.7 percent. The
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average amount contributed for those families who helped pay for college is $6,690 for
households with a college degree and $3,033 for those without. This is a per-year, perchild figure. Clearly, this indicates a significant amount of money, especially when
multiplied over several years and several children. This data comes from parents who
answered affirmatively in the surveys that they had a child in college within the last 12
months, and if so how much they contributed toward that child’s education. Given the
biennial collection of the data, this allows for some gaps in off years when children might
attend college some, but no information is colleted on how much parents helped to pay.
However, that should not significantly change the results in Table 3.
Table 4 shows the distribution of education attainment for children. Overall, 21.9
percent receive a four-year degree or more, 35.73 percent attend some college but do not
earn a four-year degree and 42.37 percent do not attend college at all. For households
with a college degree, the percentage of children earning a four-year degree or more rises
to 37.34 percent and only 23.10 percent do not attend college at all. This relationship
between parents and children’s education has been consistently documented (see
Haveman and Wolfe 1995 for a review). Furthermore, as noted above, parents with a
college degree make larger contributions toward helping pay for a college education,
which should also increase number of children with a college degree (as is found to be
the case in Keane and Wolpin 2001).
5. Results

5.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimated parameters of the model are reported in table 5. There are a total of 48
parameters estimated here. While that is a large number of parameters, the data consist
of over 3,139 household-period observations. These are then fit to the various choices in
the model including a choice of zero to four children in each of the first three periods, an
amount to contribute toward education for the fourth period of children’s lives, and an
amount to save in each period. Moreover, the latter two are allowed to be continuous
choice variables.
Several of the estimated parameters are of direct interest by themselves. In the
specified CRRA utility function for consumption, γ is the coefficient of relative risk
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aversion, 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and γ+1 is the coefficient of
relative prudence (Kimball, 1990). The estimate for γ, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, is 2.8. This in turn implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.357
and a coefficient of prudence is 3.8. While prior estimates relative risk aversion and
elasticity of substitution vary quite a bit, these estimates are in line with typical estimates.
Hubbard et al. (1994) discuss previous estimates when deciding on what value to use in
their analysis and conclude that a typical estimate for the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is 3, which is what they proceed to use. The estimate here, while indicating
slightly more willingness to make intertemporal substitutions, is very similar. Looking
at other studies indicates that if anything the estimate here of the willingness to make
intertemporal substitution is on the low end.

Hurd (1989) estimates intertemporal

substitution of between 0.89 and 1.4. Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate a coefficient of
relative risk aversion of 0.5 which implies a much lower coefficient of relative prudence
of 1.5. They attribute this to their specific limits on borrowing constraints keeping those
with steep earnings profiles, but still facing earnings uncertainty, from borrowing heavily
as opposed to relying on a high degree of prudence. The estimate here suggests more
prudence even with borrowing constraints. The difference is presumably a result of the
modeling of the endogenous fertility choice and that the desire to afford children and
spending on education provide a possible explanation for the greater prudence. The
decision to have a child locks the household into some additional expenses for three
periods, and the spending on education is a one-period chance that the household cannot
intertemporally substitute into other periods.

Both of these factors would seem to

encourage a greater degree of prudence for households.
The estimated parameters for the children’s educational outcome suggest that both
parental offers for financing and the parents’ education level both have a sizeable impact
on the outcome. The marginal effects indicated by the ordered probit estimates are
nonlinear and themselves functions of the values of parental contributions and education

levels.8 Table 6 shows some of the predicted probabilities for a child’s education for
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different levels of parental contribution and education, along with the marginal impact of
an additional dollar on the probabilities. Note that these predictions are drawn just from
the ordered probit and not model simulation predictions, which allow for the endogenous
choice of the offers. For evaluating the impact of the level of parents’ education, the
marginal impact can be seen by comparing the change in the predicted probabilities.
However, again the marginal effect is contingent on the contribution amount. Evaluated
at the entire sample average contribution of $4,273 per year, children from a household
with a parent with a college degree have a 15 percent probability of no college education
versus 37 percent for those from a household without a parent with college degree, a
difference of 22 percentage points. The probabilities of a four-year college degree are 43
percent versus 18 percent, an increase in 25 percentage points for children with a collegeeducated parent. The gap is even wider when factoring in the fact that more educated
households also contribute more money toward their children’s education. For example,
the probability of a child having no college education is only 9 percent for households
with a college-educated parent contributing $6,336 per year (the average for highereducated households).

The probability of no college education for a child from a

household without a college-educated parent is 45 percent when contributing $2,054, the
average for such households. This is a gap of 36 percentage points. Evaluated at these
offer amounts, the probabilities of a child with a four-year degree are 54 percent versus
14 percent, a difference of 40 percentage points.
The parameters estimates also indicate a sizeable impact from parental
contributions to the educational attainment of their children. The marginal impact of
additional parental contributions changes as the amount contributed changes.

The

marginal impact also differs between households with a parent with a college degree and
those without.

For example, an additional dollar reduces the probability of no college

education for a child by as much as 0.007 percentage points to 0.001 percentage points
for college-educated households. So that means an additional $1,000 contributed per
8

The marginal effect of variable, x k ∈ x , on the probability that certain choice j is selected is given
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year will lower the probability of a child getting no college education by 1 to 7 percent.
The impact is the greatest for college-educated households when they are not
contributing, and then steadily falls for these households, which is partly because the
probability of no college falls so low.

This marginal effect is smaller at first for

households without a college-educated parent, but remains more stable as more is
offered. Still, additional dollars have a decreasing marginal impact. For example, the
marginal effect of the first dollar offered reduces the probability of no college by 0.004
percentage points and this slows reduces to 0.002 as parents offer more. At the same
time, an additional dollar offered increases the probability of a four-year degree, but this
marginal impact rises and then eventually falls as well. For example the marginal impact
on the probability of a four-year degree for college-educated households begins at 0.005
for the first dollar, rises to over 0.0065 and then falls back below 0.005. Again a similar
pattern is true for less educated households, but the marginal impact is smaller, and hence
more stable, rising from 0.0019, up to 0.0026 and then falling slightly. The marginal
impact on the probability of some college education starts positive and then eventually
becomes negative as the probability of a four-year degree grows. So, in summary, the
parameter estimates indicate a sizeable impact of both parents’ education and the offer to
help pay for college on the probability a child receives a college education. Furthermore,
this impact is magnified by the fact that the marginal impact of an additional dollar is
often larger for educated households, at least at low spending levels, though the impact
diminishes as more is spent for all households.
A few other parameter estimates are worth mentioning at this point. The discount
rate for a six-year period, δ, is estimated at 0.8797 which is the equivalent of 0.979 per
year. This is actually less discounting than would be implied by the real interest rate,
which is set at three percent. The child-cost estimates are $77,228 per six years for
college-educated households and $41,782 for those without a college degree, both large
amounts for the respective households to cover. Lastly, the estimated taste parameters
for number of children and for children’s education, while not of interest in size

by:

∂x'κ
∂ Pr ob(outcome j | x)
= [φ ( µ j −1 − x'κ ) − φ ( µ j − x'κ )]
∂x k
∂x k
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themselves, are suggestive in their relation between college-educated households and
less-educated households. The increase in utility from an additional child is greater for
less-educated households, and does not decline as rapidly with increasing numbers of
children. The utility of additional education is also surprisingly greater for less-educated
households, but in this case the decrease in marginal utility is more rapid for those
households.

This may be necessary to get enough college spending from those

households, while college-educated households both have more money and the
probability of their children getting a college degree is much higher.
5.2 Model Fit
Before turning to a further discussion of the implications of the model on educational
savings policies and the fertility decisions in subsequent sections, I now turn to providing
some information on the fit of the model. Table 7 presents some summary statistics for
the actual data and a simulated sample of 10,000 households based on the model
parameter estimates. As the table shows, the model does well in matching most average
characteristics in the data.

In general the model solidly captures the increasing

accumulation of assets. The model does slightly understate the average assets levels for
younger households, overstate them in middle age and understate them again as
households move into their fifties. This is true for both college-educated and lesseducated households as is shown graphically in figure 5. The averages are not too far off
in general. At most the means are off by 15 percent, for college educated households
when they ages 24-29 and 10 percent for households without a college degree when they
are ages 42-47. The remainder of the time the average is off by less than 10 percent.
Additional information on the fit of predicted asset levels is provided in figures 68. Figure 6 shows the predicted asset accumulation for households broken down by both
education levels and number of children. The model clearly captures the qualitative
trends seen for the actual data in figure 4. Households with no kids save less in early
years, but have the highest asset levels by their fifties. Households with children save
more early on, but have lower average asset levels by their fifties, especially those with
four or five children. Figure 7 shows separate asset accumulation panels for households
with different numbers of children, comparing the paths of the actual data and the
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simulated data.

Again the qualitative trends are clearly captured, including the

changing pace of asset accumulation. However, especially for households with 4 and 5
children, the actual levels are over or understated by a noticeable amount. However, the
sample size for these households is definitely smaller. Figure 8 plot the cumulative
distribution of assets for households in different age brackets and different education
levels. As seen here, when looks at all households, the general trend is for the predicted
data to be more disperse than the actual data. That is the predicted distribution has fatter
tails.
The model does a reasonably good job in matching the percentage of children
with different levels of education. For example, for households with a college-educated
parent the model overstates the percentage with no college education by just 0.9 percent,
understates the percentage with some college by just 0.56 percent and understates the
percentage with a 4 year degree by just 0.34 percent. For households without a parent
with a college degree, the predicted percentages are equally good. For all households
together, however, the percentages are off by a bit more, largely because the model does
a slightly less good job with predicting the relative number of children in households of
different education levels, as will be mentioned in more detail below. Still, the simulated
sample only understates the percentage with no college degree by 1.78 percent, overstates
the percentage with some college by .45 percent and overstates the percentage with a
four-year degree by 1.33 percent.
The model simulation matches average amounts contributed by households to
their children’s college education quite well. As table 7 shows, overall the simulated
sample average is $4,364 per-child, per-year, while the actual data average is just slightly
less at $4,273. For households with a college degree the average is higher, at $6,390 for
the simulated data and $6,336 for the actual data, but again very little difference. The
same is true for less educated households where the average in the simulated sample is
$2,185 versus $2,054 in the actual data. However, some distributional aspects of these
offers are clearly not matched as well.

The model noticeably underpredicts the

percentage of parents actually spending money on their children’s education. The model
predicts 70.69 percent of households contributing to their children’s education, while the
actual data show 81.71 percent contributing.

This discrepancy shows up in both

38

household education levels:

61.87 percent in the model simulation versus 67.72

percent in the data for less-educated households, and 82.80 percent versus 94.71 percent
for households with a college degree.

These lower percentages contributing are

accompanied by a wider dispersion of offers, particularly on the high end, within the
simulated data versus the actual data.
When looking at the number of children, the model again does fairly well in
predicting the average number of children, but again misses a bit more on some aspects
of the broader distribution. The average number of children in the data is 2.31 versus
2.28 in the simulated data9. Beyond just the overall average, the model also does well in
matching the average number of children born at different ages for a household. The
averages for mothers aged 18-23 years old, 24-29 years old and 30-35 years old are
0.896, 0.890 and 0.527 respectively in the actual data. The model simulation matches
this quite will with averages of 0.887, 0.876 and 0.520. The fit is similarly good when
looking separately ad households of different education levels, as is also shown in table 7.

6. Education Policy Simulations

Given the model estimates, policy experiments can be made to evaluate the impact of
policies that would impact the amount that parents contribute to their children’s education
or the impact that these contributions have. As was discussed in section 2, , there are a
variety of educational reforms aimed at making a college education more affordable
and/or helping parents save for their children’s education. The section here uses a
simulation of 10,000 households, proportioned by education as is in the data, to examine
how their savings and educational contribution decisions would change in the presence of
policies similar to an increase direct college subsidies, a tax credit, a tax credit with an
income limit and the introduction of a tax-advantaged educational savings account. The
change in the distribution of education levels of children is also examined. While the tax
reform act of 1997 did introduce and/or expand policies such as these, assuming that the

9

Remember that the data here are limited to married families with a stable marriage, so these are higher
than the total population.
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policies were largely unexpected by households, the households used to estimate the
model certainly were not impacted by them over their life-cycle paths.
The specific policy adjustments that are considered are as follows. The first is a
$1,000 education grant. This appears in the model as a default offer to all children, that is
the amount when parents offer nothing, of $1,000 instead of nothing. The second policy
is a tax credit to parents for all money spent on their children’s education. In the model
this basically means that parents don’t actually have to pay out part of their offered
contribution when children go to school, and the savings is equal to their marginal tax
rate times the contribution. This is complicated by the fact that the original model
embeds the changing tax code and tax brackets throughout the lives of the households. In
the experiment I just use the federal 2001 tax brackets for the marginal rates on married
households filing jointly.10

As such, the credit is really like a partial rebate on your

college expenditures that depends on the amount you contribute and your current income.
The third policy is this same credit, but with a cap at $40,000 ($10,000 for four years) on
the amount of contributions eligible for the credit. The final policy is the addition of an
education savings account. For this experiment, instead of just one type of assets, there
are now two types of savings: regular savings and educational savings. The educational
savings account is allowed to grow tax-free and the earnings are not taxable as long as
they are spent on education. Any amount not spent on education becomes taxable. Since
there are no taxes directly in the model, this tax-free savings is modeled as an increase in
the return on savings equal to the amount of the default return times the parents’ marginal
tax rate. Parents can only contribute to these accounts if they have children and cannot
contribute more than $7,500 per child per year. When the child turns 18, which is period
4 in the model, the amount in the account must either be contributed toward education
(which is obviously contingent on the child attending college) or a penalty is paid. The
penalty is an amount equal to the current marginal tax rate of the parents times any
unspent balance in the account. The addition of the second asset class does create an
additional state variable in the model and it is a second continuous variable. This creates
10

These are 15% for income less than $45,200, 28% for income between $45,200 and $109,250, 31% for
income between $109,250 and $166,500, 36% for income between $166,500 and $297,350 and 39.6% for
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a much larger state space across which the problem must be solved, thought the
extended model does not need to be estimated, just get an obtainable solution. The same
solution procedure is used as before, except that now the Keane-Wolpin smoothing
regressions are now applied across both asset classes.
Table 10 presents the results of the policy experiments. The reported amounts are
the sample statistics for the appropriate simulated data set. The base simulation is the
original model as estimated and discussed above. The $1,000 grant has the smallest
impact on the average amount contributed by parents, and the average is lower than in the
base simulation. However, that is to be expected since every child is in effect already
receiving a $1,000 per year contribution, and the marginal impact of contributions is
decreasing as contributions increase. Interestingly, though, the average contribution from
parents does decline by a full $1,000, so on net more is being contributed in total toward
education. For all households, the average contribution falls by $681 so the net amount
from parents and the grant increases by $319. For households with a college degree the
average contribution by parents declines by $573, indicating an increase in total
contributions including the grant of $427. Similarly for parents without a college degree,
there is decline of parental contributions of $800, which means an increase in total
contribution of $200. The percentage of parents contributing also falls noticeably, but
again 100 percent of children are receiving a $1,000 contribution from the new grant. So
while only 55 percent of parents contribute above and beyond the grant, a decline of just
over 15 percentage points from the percentage contributing before the grant, there is still
a sizeable impact on the distribution of education outcomes for children. The percentage
of children with no college education falls by almost five percent, from 40.6 percent to
35.8 percent. The percentage with some college education rises by 1.5 percent, from 36.2
percent to 37.7 percent and the percentage with a college degree rises by 3.3 percent from
23.23 percent to 26.54 percent. Furthermore, the improvement is actually greater for
children whose parents have no college education, even though the grant itself was not
means tested. For these children, the percentage receiving no college education actually
falls by 6.3 percent, from 52.4 percent to 46.1 percent.
income above $297,350. Since the income in the model is over six year periods, I divide this by six to get
the associated tax bracket.
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The tax credit generates a larger increase in average contributions than the grant
and also increases the percentage of parents contributing, but the net impact on
educational outcomes is less. The average contribution rises to $5,963, an increase of
almost $1,600. This is true for households of both education levels, those with a college
degree show a $1,509 increase and those without a college degree show a $1,681
increase. Furthermore the percentage of parents contributing rises from 70.69 percent to
82.55 percent. The increase is the greatest among parents without a college degree,
where the percentage contributing rises from 61.87 percent to 80.16 percent, while the
increase is just 3 percentage points, from 82.8 percent to 85.8 percent, for parents with a
college degree. This suggests that while the credit did increase the amount of support
from college educated parents who gave support, it did not greatly increase the
percentage contributing. Certainly this is partly due to the already high percentage of
educated parents who give support.
While the amounts spent by parents did go up on average, and the increase was
greater than with the grant experiment, the impact on educational outcomes was less.
The percentage receiving no college degree did fall, but only by 2.6 percent (from 40.59
percent to 37.99 percent), which is noticeably less than the 4.8 percent decline with the
grant. The associated increase in the percentages with some college and a four-year
degree are0 .47 percentage points and 2.13 percentage points respectively. Compared to
the grant, these increases are smaller, though the relative shift toward a four-year degree
is more. This is presumably due to the fact that the grant is available to all children,
which in effect ups the contribution percentage to 100 percent. Coupling this with the
fact that the estimated marginal impact of the offer is generally decreasing, this can
explain the superior performance of the grant. Interestingly, the simulated expected perhousehold cost of the grant is lower than the lost tax revenue from the credit. The
expected cost of the grant comes to $4,146 per household, while the expected credit costs
are $5,775 per household. Imposing the high, $10,000 per year, cap on the amount
eligible for the credit does reduce this cost to $5,364. The cap also lowers the average
contribution by almost $300, when compared to having the credit without the cap in
place. However, the cap made no significant difference to the percentage of parents
contributing, nor on the distribution of educational outcomes. For example, the cap only
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reduced the decline in the percentage of children with no college education by 0.16
percentage points. This is because with the cap so high, it is not a factor in getting people
to contribute, and it only reduces contributions for those families who already contributed
so much that the marginal impact of the declining offers is not large.
One interesting result from these first three experiments is that there is virtually
no impact on the number of children that families have or on their asset accumulation
paths at younger ages. The average number of children iss exactly the same before and
after the tax credit experiments, and rose only by 0.001 in the grant experiment.
Furthermore, when looking at asset accumulation of parents up to age 41, there is not
much difference at all from the base simulation. The grant did lower the averages a tiny
amount ($6 for ages 24-29, $11 for ages 30-35 and $45 for ages 36-41) but this is by less
than 0.05 percent in each instance. In the later years, asset levels are higher than the base
simulation, because parents are spending less on education, but again, while larger, the
increase is not great. For example, by ages 48-53, the average asset level increases by
$2,224 or 1 percent. While the pattern of increasing and decreasing is different for the
credit experiment, the size of the changes is again very small. Average assets increase by
$3 both with and without the cap for households ages 24-29, by $16 and $18 with the cap
and without for ages 30-35, and $66 and $69 with and without the cap for ages 36-41. At
later ages the assets are lower that the base simulation, as parents spend more on their
children’s education. However, even by age 48-53, the average assets are only about 0.5
percent lower.

The pattern here suggest that while there is a relationship between

income, fertility, savings and educational spending, as is seen in the asset accumulation
patterns shown in the data and the results section (see figure 6 for example), these
particular policies do not have a sizeable impact on the fertility or savings decisions.
The education savings account, on the other hand, does have an influence on
fertility and savings, as well as parental contributions and the educational outcomes of
children. This experiment shows the largest increase in contributions from parents. Over
all households, the average parental contribution increases $2,072, to $6,436, from $4364
in the base simulation. Surprisingly, the increase is actually greater for households where
neither parent has a college degree. For college-educated parents the increase is $1549,
up to $7939, while for those without a college degree the increase is $2,233, up to an
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average of $4,418.

This result is most likely driven by the fact that the marginal

impact of additional contributions is decreasing. Since more of the lower-educated
households are not contributing or saving as much, the marginal impact of their increases
in offers is greater, so a lesser marginal incentive to save is needed. Certainly this result
is not what is expected of a policy that is often presumed to benefit wealthier households
more.

Both groups of households also see an increase the percentage of parents

contributing: from 82.80 percent to 90.21 percent for parents with a college degree and
from 61.87 percent to 74.10 percent for parents without a college degree. With greater
contributions and an overall parental contribution rate of 82.56 percent, the percentage of
children with no college education fall by 6 percent, to 35 percent from 41 percent, and
the percentage with a four-year degree rises to 27.92 percent from 23.23 percent. This
improvement is even greater than that from the grant experiment. However, the cost is
also higher. Here the cost is lost revenue from taxable earnings on the education savings.
The cost per household comes to almost $8,000. However, much of this lost revenue is
on earning from savings that were not present from the base scenario, making this
estimate hard to compare. If the amount of savings is held to the base simulated levels,
the lost revenue is just $2,593 per household.
The higher contributions, and the associated large cost in lost tax revenue, are due
in large part to the fact that the education savings account experiment actually stimulates
a large amount of new savings. Unlike the other policy experiments done here, the
education savings account greatly alters savings behavior.

Average savings for

households increases by 20 percent by ages 24-29, 28 percent by ages 30-35 and still by
16 percent for ages 46-41. After that, assets levels are largely unchanged for ages 42-47
and then actually one percent lower for ages 48-53. This clearly indicates that there is
additional savings, beyond the amount accounted for just by a higher return, and that it is
used by families to help pay for their children’s education. The average amounts in the
education accounts are also shown in table 10. While they are indeed greater than the
increase in savings, especially in later years, they are also not just created from a shift of
assets from traditional savings to the higher-return education savings accounts. Along
with the increase in savings, fertility rates also rise to where the average number of
children 2.410, up from 2.282. Again, this is presumably due to having access to the
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improved return on savings along with the improved ability to have college-educated
children.
7. Conclusion

The model presented here gives structural estimates of dynamic, life-cycle model with
the choices of having children, spending on children’s college education, and savings and
consumption all made endogenously. The model also allows for borrowing constraints,
uncertain lifetime income, and allows for heterogeneity between parents with different
levels of education. The model is solved using backward induction and a regression
smoothing procedure and is then model is then estimated with a simulated maximum
likelihood procedure using data from the National Longitudinal Survey. The estimated
model is then used to run policy experiments to gauge the impact of several recently
implemented programs to increase parental support for children’s education.
The estimates imply that there is a positive relationship between income,
education, having children, and savings behavior. Families with 3 or fewer save more at
young ages than those without children, yet married couples without children have
greater savings by the time they reach their mid-thirties. The reason is the costs of not
only raising children, which are estimated to by quite large, but also of helping to pay for
a college education. The model is able to capture the interactions more effectively than if
fertility was the result of an exogenous process. The model estimates that the fast
majority of patents, over 70 percent, offer to aid in college expenses and that the average
amount is significant, at over $4,000 per year, per child. Furthermore, the size of the
offer has a sizeable impact on the educational attainment of children. For example, an
additional $1,000 will reduce the probability a child receives no education by anywhere
from 4 percent to 7 percent. The marginal impact of this additional money is decreasing
as the offer size increases, and the impact differs for parents with a college degree and
those without a college degree.

Furthermore, the estimates indicate that children’s

educational attainment is also directly influenced by the education level of parents.
The policy experiments examine the impact of an education grant/subsidy, tax
breaks for education spending, and the creation of a targeted savings account. The
experiments suggest that a $1,000 grant available to all students and the creation of tax-
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free savings accounts with a limit of $7,500 a year both have a greater impact on
education outcomes than the tax credit. The grant is effective because it in essence
increases the percentage of households offering support to 100%, and households do not
decrease the amounts they offer beyond this by the full $1,000. Furthermore, given that
the initial money offered has the largest marginal impact, getting offer rates up is very
beneficial. The savings account, on the other hand, vastly raises the amount that parents
offer. This is because the return on using the accounts is higher. Furthermore, the
percentage of households making offers also rises substantially as the benefit of having
children with post-secondary education becomes more attainable.

Interestingly, the

greatest increase in both contributions and improving probabilities of receiving a college
education are among lower educated households, even with the education savings
account, which is not necessarily what is expected.
A number of limitation in the model used here still remain. Several problems
remain with how the model treats the actual education choice of children. First, the
education decisions of children are not modeled in a fundamental way. Future work to
include this decision more directly, and even perhaps worked into a cooperative or
noncooperative framework with parents would allow for a better understanding of this
process. Futhermore, there is no allowance in the model for studying the choice of
college to attend. Other studies present evidence that there is substantial substitution, for
example, between private and public four-year schools in response to price increases (see
for example, Cameron and Heckman, 1999.) The model here does not directly account
for the price of college or the rise in college expenses and their impact. These are just
suppresses as part of the estimated outcome process. In addition, there are no difference
in the quality of college education here. It is very likely that parental contributions may
influence the “quality” of school attended.

Lastly, there is no direct accounting for the

negative impact that greater parental assets and contributions might have on reducing
financial aid that would otherwise be available. In the estimation here, such effects are
just evident in the falling marginal impact of parental contributions. Allowing for these
factors within a dynamic framework, and finding data rich enough to estimate the such a
multi-faceted analysis, is clearly a challenge for future research.
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TABLE 1

No. Obs.

SAMPLE SIZE AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN
Highest Grade Competed
High School
or less
College
311
245

Children (mean)
Children born when 18-23 (mean)
Children born when 24-29 (mean)
Children born when 30-35 (mean)

2.395
1.225
0.826
0.344

2.208
0.478
0.971
0.759

All
556
2.313
0.896
0.890
0.527
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TABLE 2
NET ASSETS*
Age
(No. Obs.)

Mean
(Median)

18-23
(556)
24-29
(556)
30-35
(556)
36-41
(556)
42-47
(556)
48-53
(318)
54-59
(41)

4,290
(965)
24,140
(12,342)
59,858
(41,957)
85,820
(56,331)
131,628
(85,364)
218,947
(133,470)
263,326
(145,000)

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Percent
Negative

Mean if
Negative

All

By Parents
Education:
High School
or Less
18-23
(311)
24-29
(311)
30-35
(311)
36-41
(311)
42-47
(311)
48-53
(185)
54-59
(30)
* 1999 dollars

4,431
(287)
19,291
(5,628)
45,943
(28,166)
62,472
(38,024)
89,729
(57,938)
157,730
(85,000)
174,348
(82,500)

10,330

-9,480

77,443

10.07

-1,172

36,968

-12,776

297,912

8.81

-1,597

74,375

-20,561

587,955

6.29

-2,685

104,145

-28,095

673,160

7.01

-3,399

148,201

-11,266

1,093,175

3.60

-1,965

245,800

-18,950

1,196,500

1.89

-3,026

298,600

-5,000

1,246,000

2.44

-1,620

11,028

-8,617

77,443

9.32

-933

30,695

-10,029

196,752

10.61

-1,591

61,429

-16,477

401,446

8.04

-2,391

86,877

-28,095

661,441

10.29

-3,202

111,792

-11,266

790,741

6.11

-1,908

199,906

-10,000

1,126,000

1.62

-1,493

237,751

-5,000

945,500

6.67

-1,620
continued…
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TABLE 2
CONTINUED
Age
(No. Obs.)
By Parents
Education:
College
18-23
(245)
24-29
(245)
30-35
(245)
36-41
(245)
42-47
(245)
48-53
(133)
54-59
(11)

Mean
(Median)

4,111
(1,555)
30,296
(17,887)
77,523
(56,912)
115,458
(80,958)
184,814
(137,546)
304,100
(213,700)
505,996
(456,000)

Std. Dev.

Percent Mean if
Negative Negative

Min.

Max.

9,391

-9,479

64,789

11.02

-1,657

42,935

-12,776

297,913

6.53

-1,611

85,017

-20,561

587,955

4.08

-3,673

116,209

-27,462

673,160

2.86

-4,495

170,301

-8,416

1,093,175

0.41

-2,872

277,183

-18,950

1,196,500

2.26

-6,091

322,794

144,000

1,246,000

-

-
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TABLE 3
CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD CHILDREN'S COLLEGE EDUCATION
Percent
Mean if
No. Obs.
Mean*
Contributing Contributing*
All
328
4,273
81.71
5,230
By Parents Education:
High School or Less
158
2,054
67.72
3,033
College
170
6,336
94.71
6,690
* 1999 dollars
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TABLE 4
CHILDREN'S EDUCATION ATTAINMENT

All
By Parents Education:
High School or Less
College

Percent
No College
42.37

Percent
Some College
35.73

Percent
4-year Degree
or More
21.90

52.49
23.10

33.72
39.56

13.79
37.34
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TABLE 5
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Utility Function
λ11c
λ1c
0.8271a 5.3555a

λ12c
5.4439a

λ13c
6.0019a

λ2c
λ2h
α1c
a
a
-0.6286 0.1431 0.0041a

α1h
0.0053a

α2c
α2h
θ1c
θ1h
θ2c
b
b
a
a
-0.3699 -0.5472 0.0087 0.0122 -0.5421b

γ
2.8263

λ1h
λ11h
λ12h
-0.2912a 5.9955a 8.6061a

λ13h
1.7350a

θ2h
-0.8246b

Income
β0
11.0244

β1
0.3348

bc
0.9575

bh
0.0088

β2
-0.0354

β3
-0.1927

β4
0.1684

β5
-0.0065

β6
0.9626

κ1
κ2
1.1023c -3.8649a

κ3
0.4040

κ4
0.7243c

κ5
0.1011a

σih
0.5182

σretc
42275

σreth
23275

β7
-0.2011

Children's Education
µ1
0.07189

µ2
1.2974

Error Distribution
σc
0.0101

σn
σe
7.9767a 1.3856c

Other Parameters
δ
0.8797

ψc
77228

ψn
41782

a

8

b

11

Parameter multiplied by 10
Parameter multiplied by 10

c

Parameter multiplied by 1000

σic
0.7082

ση
0.0285

β8
-0.3001
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TABLE 6
ESTIMATED EDUCATION PROBABILITIES BY PARENT CONTIBUTION AND EDUCATION
Parental Contribution
$0
$2,054
$4,273
$6,336
$10,000
Households with College Degree:
Prob(no college)
36.99%
24.47%
14.83%
9.04%
3.74%
Marginal impact of $1
-0.000069 -0.000055 -0.000039 -0.000026 -0.000012
Prob(some college)
44.43%
45.87%
42.38%
36.47%
25.15%
Marginal impact of $1
0.000020 -0.000006 -0.000027 -0.000037 -0.000038
Prob(4-year degree)
18.58%
27.66%
42.80%
54.49%
71.12%
Marginal impact of $1
0.000049 0.000061 0.000065 0.000063 0.000050
High School Degree or Less:
Prob(no college)
Marginal impact of $1
Prob(some college)
Marginal impact of $1
Prob(4-year degree)
Marginal impact of $1

52.87%
44.50%
37.12%
31.87%
25.98%
-0.000044 -0.000040 -0.000035 -0.000031 -0.000023
37.41%
41.65%
44.39%
45.59%
45.98%
0.000025 0.000018 0.000010 0.000005 -0.000001
9.73%
13.85%
18.49%
22.54%
28.04%
0.000019 0.000023 0.000025 0.000026 0.000024
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TABLE 7
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SELECTED OUTCOMES
Actual
Predicted
All Households:
Assets* (mean by age):
24-29
24,140
22,292
30-35
59,858
57,925
36-41
85,820
86,193
42-47
131,628
138,729
48-53
218,947
215,224
Children (mean)
Children born when 18-23 (mean)
Children born when 24-29 (mean)
Children born when 30-35 (mean)

2.313
0.896
0.890
0.527

2.282
0.887
0.876
0.520

Contributions to College* (mean)
Percent Contributing
Childrens Education Attainment (percent):
No College
Some College
4-year degree or more

4,273
81.71

4,364
70.69

42.37
35.73
21.90

40.59
36.18
23.23

19,291
45,943
62,472
89,729
157,730

18,643
43,968
59,811
98,315
155,317

Children (mean)
Children born when 18-23 (mean)
Children born when 24-29 (mean)
Children born when 30-35 (mean)

2.395
1.225
0.826
0.344

2.370
1.235
0.804
0.331

Contributions to College* (mean)
Percent Contributing
Childrens Education Attainment (percent):
No College
Some College
4-year degree or more
* 1999 dollars

2,054
67.72

2,185
61.87

By Education:
Households with High School Degree or Less:
Assets* (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53

52.49
33.72
13.79

52.43
34.23
13.34
continued…
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TABLE 7
CONTINUED
Actual

Predicted

30,296
77,523
115,458
184,814
304,100

25,654
75,642
119,681
190,031
300,348

Children (mean)
Children born when 18-23 (mean)
Children born when 24-29 (mean)
Children born when 30-35 (mean)

2.208
0.478
0.971
0.759

2.117
0.445
0.967
0.759

Contributions to College* (mean)
Percent Contributing
Childrens Education Attainment (percent):
No College
Some College
4-year degree or more
* 1999 dollars

6,336
94.71

6,390
82.80

23.10
39.56
37.34

24.00
39.00
37.00

Households with College Degree:
Assets* (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53

\
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TABLE 8
POLICY EXPERIMENTS
Base
All Households:
Parent Contributions to College (mean)
Percent of Parents Contributing
Childrens Education (percent):
No College
Some College
4-year degree or more
Children (mean)
Total Assets (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53
Educational Savings (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53
By Household Education:
High School Degree or Less:
Parent Contributions to College (mean)
Percent of Parents Contributing
Childrens Education (percent):
No College
Some College
4-year degree or more
Children (mean)
Total Assets (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53
Educational Savings (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53

Grant

Credit

Credit Ed. Sav.
w/ Limit Account

4,364
70.69

3,605
54.51

5,963
82.55

5,610
82.50

6,436
82.56

40.59
36.18
23.23
2.282

35.80
37.66
26.54
2.285

37.99
36.65
25.36
2.283

38.15
36.61
25.24
2.283

34.91
37.17
27.92
2.410

22,292 22,286 22,295 22,295 26,812
57,925 57,914 57,941 57,943 73,905
86,193 86,148 86,259 86,262 100,009
138,729 139,246 138,245 138,306 139,286
219,224 221,448 218,627 218,942 216,791
1,360
13,759
31,525
51,321
45,756

2,185
61.87

1,385
43.72

3,866
80.16

3,765
80.06

4,418
74.10

52.43
34.23
13.34
2.370

46.10
37.13
16.77
2.373

49.29
35.30
15.41
2.371

49.43
35.19
15.38
2.371

48.03
35.91
16.06
2.644

19,643 19,647 19,647 19,648 29,878
43,968 43,964 43,990 43,993 57,222
59,811 59,760 59,921 59,928 76,645
98,315 98,861 97,553 97,649 102,638
155,317 156,567 153,905 154,082 144,641
1,185
11,267
26,002
46,814
42,370
continued…
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TABLE 8
CONTINUED
Base
Households with College Degree:
Parent Contributions to College (mean)
Percent of Parents Contributing
Childrens Education(percent):
No College
Some College
4-year degree or more
Children (mean)
Total Assets (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53
Educational Savings (mean by age):
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53

Grant

Credit

Credit Ed. Sav.
w/ Limit Account

6,390
82.80

5,817
69.32

7,899
85.84

7,548
85.84

7,939
90.21

24.00
39.00
37.00
2.117

21.48
38.40
40.12
2.118

22.31
38.51
39.18
2.117

22.46
38.59
38.95
2.117

20.16
39.20
40.64
2.223

25,654 25,656
25,656 25,657 27,011
75,642 75,624
75,650 75,651 94,099
119,681 119,644 119,692 119,690 128,734
190,031 190,511 189,898 189,916 195,500
300,348 303,807 300,783 301,274 280,819
1,816
18,531
38,532
57,041
50,168
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FIGURE 1
ASSET ACCUMULATION BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN
Assets (thousands)
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FIGURE 2
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED MEAN ASSET ACCUMULATION
Assets (thousands)
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FIGURE 3
SIMULATED ASSET ACCUMULATION BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN
Assets (thousands)
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FIGURE 4
ACTUAL AND SIMULATED ASSET ACCUMULATION:
All Households
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FIGURE 5
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED CUMULATIVE ASSET DISTRIBUTIONS:
All Households
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